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ABSTRACT OF EVIDENCE^ &o. 

IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT MARTIAL 

v on t 1 1 E 

TRIAL OF COL. T. WORTHINGTQIn 

AT MEMPHIS, AUGUST 14th, 1- 



Gen. Thos. Worthmgtou, of Warren county, 
Ohio, being in Washington on business at the 
time of the Bull .Bun disaster, in consequence 
thereof, offered a regiment to the Government, 
which was accepted. The new Col., and his 
course of proceeding to get into the service, 
which was irregular, met with little active as- 
sistance and some positive opposition from the 
Executive of Ohio. ■ With the countenance of 
Adit. Gen. Buckingham, though at great risk 
of failure and expense of time and funds, the 
regiment (46th Ohio) was organized January 
30th, 1862, and readied Paducah Ferny 20th, 
where Gen. W. T. Sherman was then in com- 
mand. After some conversation with the Gen- 
in which Coi. W. urged the immediate oc- 
cupation and fortification of Florence, Alabama, 
or some point near the Muscle Shoals, he was 
not favorably impressed with the prob 
of Gen. Halleck and Sherman, and in accord- 
ance with a conversation with General 0. M. 
Mitchell the previous Nov'r., requested a trans 



evidence after the 5th of April, while Gen. Sher- 
man testified to his own operations up to the 
Ilth. 

On offering his resignation Aug. 10th, 1862, 
Col. T. Worthington, 46th 0. V. I., was arrest- 
ed, in consequence of Gen. Sherman's getting 
surreptitious possession of an imperfect proof 
sheet of the following Diary extracts originally 
intended for Gen. Halleck, (as was proven be- 
fore the court,) and with other matters, pre- 
pared for him, on his expressing his consent and 
wish for such a communication. The first and 
second charges were for being drunk "on duty," 
specially and habituall}-, and can be proven false 
by the record of the court. 

The 3d charge was for conduct unbecoming 
an officer and a gentleman. The 1st specifica- 
tion of this charge (like all the charges,) was 
grossly false and malicious, and to its main 
point no ground of evidence was or could be ad- 
duced. The 2d specification is as follows : 

In this that the said Col. Worthington did 



fer to his Division in Middle Tennessee. This i print or cause to be printed on a sheet for cir- 
conversation and consequent request preceded | dilation what purported to be extracts from his 



the brigading of the regiment then at Paducah. 
Compliance with the request was not eonsid- 
\ ered feasible, and originated a personal differ- 
' nee between the parties, wliieh was further in- 
creased by Gen. Sherman's bootless and ill- 
advised expedition to Eastport, (March 14-th,) 
culminated in the trial of Col. W. before a 
court martial ordered and appointed by Gen. 
Sherman at Memphis, August 14th, 1862. This 
court martial had been sought by Col. W.. in 
hopes of getting exact and reliable information 
as to who was responsible /or the butchery and 
disgrace at Shiloh. This was done so effec- 
tively as to fix the criminality on the proper 
party, but not so effectively as to develops Gen. 
Sherman's utter incompetency as an army com- 
mander in the field — nor as to prove the nu- 
merous errors of fact in, and the injustice of his 
Division Beport. dated tl. 18th of April, 1862, 
3ol. W. not being allowed the advantage of any 



Diary of the Tennessee Expedition, containing 
false and libelous matter, calculated and de- 
signed to injure his superior officers, Col. Mc- 
Dowell and Generals Grant and Sherman. 

Specification 3d. — In this that the said Coi. 
Thos. Worthington did print or cause to be 
printed on a sheet for circulation what purpor- 
ted to be extracts from his Diary of the Ten- 
nessee Expedition, designed to secure for him- 
self a popular reputation for prophesy and fore- 
sight, which said diary was not made contem- 
poraneous with the dates in it, but was fabricated 
or manufactured after the occasion, to fulfill 
some base and dishonorable purpose. 

On this 3d charge the Court pi mil Col. W. 
not guilty of the 1st and 3d specifications, but 
guilty of the 2d specification, and guilty of the 
charge of having printed false and libelous mat- 
ter, &c. With what justice may be gathered 
from a record of the evider.ee referred to in the 






following abstract, which is all the present time 
and means of Col. W. enables him to print, 
not for circulation, but for the information of 
his own and Gen. Sherman's friends, for the use 
of the proper authorities, and others incidentally 
affected or to be affected by a further agitation 
of the matter. 

The Court was called in contravention of the 



■ 
v, March 31, 



Monday, March 31, 1862.— Further indica- 
tions through the pickets that an attack is im- 
minent, and though I do not fear the result, a 
sudden attack, if violently made, as it will he, 
may throw us back for months. The men are 
discouraged at our delay here and the close vi- 
cinity of the rebel pickets, which should be 
driven off. Sherman is inviting an attack, which 



65th Article of War, and for this and other man- j I hope may occur, but for which we are unpre- 
ifest irregularities Col. W. claims that the pro- ; pared. 

ceedings should be set aside. Whatever the j Tuesday, April 1, 1862. — Have now over 
result, Col. W. will rest assured that, at the | one hundred rounds of amunition for all availa- 
risk of his own sacrifice, he has obtained most j ble men, and feel easy on that point. Ordered 



valuable information, now of public record 
which he had vainly endeavored to obtain 
through a military commission or Senatorial 
Committee. In establishing and fixing the 
guilt where it belongs, Col. W. may consider 
that he has done more service than when at 
Shiloh the 46th Ohio (as Gen. Sherman virtu- 
ally admits,) saved the two hours by which the 
Army of Tennessee was rescued from imminent 
destruction. ^ 

Satisfied that in this case the means justified 
the end in view, he has only to regret that be 
was not and is not in a position, even at the 
loss of life and reputation, to do something 
more for the rescue of the Union and Constitu- 
tion from impending ruin. 



Extracts from a Diary of the Tennes- 
see Expedition, 1862, by T. Worth- 
ington, Col. 46th Heg. O. "V". I. 

Wednesday, March 26, 1862.— At Camp 
Shiloh, three miles from Pittsburg Landing. 
A company being called for for picket duty to- 
day, detailed Captain Sharp's Company B. In- 
dications of an attack, if the country people are 
to be believed. Their pickets are around, and 
too near us, showing a strong effective force. 

Thursday, March 27, 1862. — This afternoon 
two of Sharp's pickets were fired on by the reb- 
el horse, about 4*4 P. M., not a mile from camp. 
A disgrace to the army that such should be the 
case, and an indication that they are covering 
some forward movement, yet Sherman is im- 
provident as ever, and takes no defensive and 
scarce any precautionary measures. He snubs 
me, and has no time to hear even a suggestion 



the Captains to send in accounts of clothing, Sec 
wanted, which the Quartermaster is very care- 
less about getting. Still no axes, which now 
he cannot get if he would, and which are worth 
more than guns at present. 

Thursday, April 3, 1863.— Rode to Pitts- 
burg Landing. The place is crowded and in 
disorder below, with noise and gambling on the 
bank above, across the road from the post office. 
Hunted up and down for clothing and axes, 
and found that Sherman had forbidden his 
Quartermaster from receiving anything. That 
Gen. Smith's Quartermaster will answer no 
requisitions ontsidc of his immediate command, 
and the Post Quartermaster, Baxter, (Grant's) 
will only answer the requisitions of the division 
Quartermasters. The reason that Sherman's 
Quartermaster will not receive any stores is 
that he has no place to put them. There are 
now at least six boats hired by the day at the 
Landing, (as I hear,) at not less than two thous- 
and ($2,000) a day, when two thousand dollars 
with that many men could in ten days or less 
put up store houses sufficient for an army of 
one hundred thousand men. And so the Gov- 
ernment will pay on this expedition so far not 
less than twenty thousand dollars, and perhaps 
ten times that before the war is over, and lose 
not less than one to ten million dollars in quar- 
termaster and commissary stores, occasioned by 
the improvidence and neglect of its Major-Gen- 
erals here, to say nothing of the disorder and 
danger growing out of such a state of things. 

Thirty-nine ) r ears ago this day, April 3, 1823, 
when a boy of sixteen, I received my appoint- 1 
ment as cadet. Its only result, besides, &c, is \ 
my present position as one of the lowest I 
nels in this war, controlled by incompetent, im-* 



Friday, March 28, 1802. — Having suggested provident and negligent Generals, and now in 



to McDowell the sending out of a stronger pick 
et. he ordered 30 more men, which were imme- 
diately volunteered. If Beauregard does not 
attack us he and the chivalry are disgraced for- 
ever, if for nothing else. 

Saturday, March 29, 1862.— Sherman has 
refused to sign a requisition for seventy-two 
axes for my regiment, making it twenty-two ; 
and while a slight abattis might prevent or 
avert an attack, there are no axes to make it, 
nor is there a sledge or crowbar in his division, 
and scarce a set of tools out of nry regiment. 



danger of death or disgrace from the want of 
capacity or integrity amidst the many above 
and the masses below me. 

The indications are (still) of an attack, which 
I have also indicated to McDowell ; we should 
now have on our right at least six batteries, and 
two regiments of cavalry to warn the rear. 
With thick woods before us and pickets scarce 
a mile out, we have no defenses whatever, and 
no means of giving an alarm but by the fire of 
musketry. The troops cover too much ground, 
and cannot support each other, and a violent 



IN EXCHANGE 

JAN 5 - ,Pir 



attack which we may expect, may drive them I Instances of false or evasive testimony by Gen. 
back in detail. God help us with so many sick W. T. Sherman, proven to be so by his own evi- 
men in camp, if we are attacked, there being dence, or by the record of the court martial held 
over five thousand unfit tor duty. 



Friday, April 4, 1862.— One of McDowell's 
pickets was shot in the hand about noon. A 
detail of Taylor's cavalry was sent out three or 
four miles ; found four to six hundred rebel 
cavalry, and fell back, returning about 2 P. M. 
Everything is carried on in a very negligent 
way, and nothing but the same conduct on the 
other side can save us from disaster. They can 
concentrate one hundred thousand men from the 
heart of rebeldora, and, with three or four rail- 
roads, have far greater facilities for handling 
troops than we have. 

Have brigade orders to stack arms at day- 
light till further orders. Keep two companies 
lying on their arms, and though as quiet as pos- 
sible, look for an attack every hour. 

Saturday, April 5, 1862.— Eode out to 
Sharp's pickets at sunrise, and found two men 
(rebel pickets) wounded yesterday, who died 
last night at the Widow Howell's. About 7 
o'clock A. M. the rebels drove in Lieut. Crary 
from the Widow Howell's, getting possession 
of their dead men. Heard in the evening that 
the rebels had established three guns (six pouud- 
ers) opposite Hildebrand's brigade, on our left, 
across the valley. Hear of five of their regiments 
arriving to-day. 

Sunday. April G. 1862. — A clear cool morn- 
ing. Rode out to the pickets at sunrise, and 
soon after the enemy were seen advancing past 
the Howell house. Directly one of Col. Hicks' 
regiment, 40th Illinois, was shot through the 
heart at not less than four hundred yards. Rode 
to McDowell's quarters, (not up,) and then 
back to the pickets, and ordered the men who had 
fallen back to advance to the Howell fence, lie- 
turned to camp for preparation, and at about 7 
A. M. the attack commenced on Hildebrand's 
and Buckland's brigades. This might have 
been expected, but we were really not ready 
for a fight. No hospitals at Pittsburg, nor even 
means to carry off the wounded. 



April 25, 1862. 
The undersigned hereby certify that most of 
the facts above set forth are correct from their 
own knowledge, and that Col. Worthington's 
remarks and anticipations are in correspondence 
with his general conversation for ten days be- 
fore the battle of the 6th of April, 18G2. 

WILLIAM SMITH, Maj. 46th Re#. O.V.I. 

J. W. HEATH, Capt. Co. A 46th Reg. O.V.I 

A. G. SHARP. " B, " " 

JNO. WISEMAN. " C, " " 

ED. N.UPTON, Lt.c'dg D, '< 

WM. PINNEY, Capt. Co. E, 

P. A. CROW, " G, " " 

M.C.LILLY, " H, 

C. C. LYBLAND, " I, « « 

I.N.ALEXANDER," K, 



at Memphis, August 14th, 1862, for the trial of 
Col. T. Worthington, &c. 

1. That he reduced a requisition of 72 axes 
to 22, because he knew what axes there were 
and were expected. Thus inducing the belief 
that there were axes on hand for his division. — 
See pp. 45 and 53, evidence of Qr. M. and Qr. 
M. Sergt. 46th Ohio. 

2. That Col. Worthington was all the time 
predicting every species of calamity, and hoping 
it might come about. — P. 51, Col. McDowell. 

3. For weeks Col. Worthington had been 
predicting the worst, and hoping it might hap- 
pen, — p. 51 Col. McDowell, and his (Sherman's) 
charge that the . predictions were made after the 
occasion, and were false and libelous. 

4. That the whole diary entry of April 3d, is 
false and libelous. — See p. 7. His own admis- 
sion that there was confusion at the landing, 
and that a place had been left for Buell's forces, 
Set. &c. 

5. That he had not forbidden his Div. Qr. M. to 
receive stores, (other than forage.) — See pp. 13 
and 51, Qr. M. and Qr. Mr. Sergt. 

6. That Col. W. had constantly prognosti- 
cated evil to Col. McDowell.— See p. 51, Mc- 
Dowell. 

7. That Col. Worthington went to the land- 
ing, while Col. Buckland, &c, went to the front 
to look for enemies. Thus charging that Col. 
W. avoided the front, when he was not only 
not ordered forward, but was forbidden to go 
beyond the line of pickets. 

8. That the army did not occupy too much 
ground. — See Gen. Sherman's testimony that a 
place was- left for Buell, who was, however, to 
go on up to Hamburgh, 6 miles above. 

9. That the infantry pickets were more than 
a mile in front of the camp. — See pp. 17, 46 and 
47, Sherman, Sergt. Gorman, Capt Sharpe. 

10. That Col. W. was alarmed for his per- 
sonal safety. — P. 17 Sherman's evidence. 

11. That he (Sherman) did not know the 
destination, and had to guess the purpose of the 
enemy in his front on Friday the 4th of April. — 
See his evidence that he had reason to expect 
an attack on Thursday, p. 8. 

12. That Col. W. kept himself in a safe cor- 
ner, looking for an attack every hour, while 
Buckland'sBrigade was in the discharge of its 
proper duty ; thus intimating cowardice on the 
part of Col. W. — P. 17, Sherman's evidence. 

13. That Col. W. could not have heard of 
three Rebel guns on our left (front.) — See pp. 
42, 47 and 48, Col. Buckland, Capt. Sharpe and 
Lt. Crary. 

14. That it was impossible for Col. W. to 
have heard of the three guns on our left (front), 



across the valley. — See pp. 42, 47 and 48, Buck- 
land, Sharpe and Crary. 

15. That the position of the supposed rebel 
artillery was within the line of our pickets on 
Saturday April 5th.— See pp. 42, 47 and 48, 
Buckland, Sharp and Crary. 

16. That he had not forbidden his Qr. Master 
to receive any stores turned over or keep any 
stores, (forage excepted. — See pp. 45 and 53, 
Col. W., Qr. M. and Qr. M. Sergt. 

17. That the statement in the diary of April 
3d, that the pickets were not moae than a mile 
out, was false. — See p. 17 Sherman's testimony, 
and p. 46 Gorman, and Sharpe 47, as to dis- 
tance of Moore's house from camp. 

IS. That the diary entry of April 3d was 
false in stating that the troops covered too much 
ground. — See his admission that a place was 
left for Buell's forces, which were to he sent to 
Hamburgh, pp. 8 and 9. 

19. That he heard of no artillery near the 
Howell house on Saturday April 5th. — See pp. 
44, 47, and 42, Cant. Sharpe and Lt. Crary, and 
Col. Buckland. 

j20. That the pickets were not driven out of 
the Howell house Saturday morning. — Pp. 44 
and 47, Sharpe and Crary. 

21. That the ground at the Howell house 
was picketed by Col. Buckland. — 43 and 47, 
Sharpe and Crary. 

22. That there were pickets in front of the 
Howell house on Saturday. — Pp. 44 and 45, 
Capt. Sharpe. 

23. That the Rebels had no battery near the 
Howell house on Saturday. — 44 and 47, Sharpe 
and Crary. 

24. That no pickets were driven in on Satur- 
day, April 5th.— Pp. 42, 45, 46 and 48, Buck- 
land, Sharp, Hildebrand and Crary. 

25. That he did not tell any one he would 
have the artillery harnessed up, unless for in- 
spection. — P. 44, Capt. Sharpe. 



Items of evidence by Gen. Sherman, before 
the court martial at Memphis, which are evasive, 
equivocative, or false, he knowing them to be 
so, but not proven by the record, though entirely 
capable of proof. Falsehoods are numbered, 
evasions are lettered. 

1. That fortifications would have been an in- 
dication of weakness, and would have invited an 
attack. 

The meaning of which is, that had we been 
fortified the attack would have been more cer- 
tain than otherwise. That Gen. Sherman could 
have believed this possible is impossible, if he 
is a sane man. The three miles of front be- 
tween his impregnable creeks could at any time 
have been fortified in less than three hours, by 
a parapet 7 feet above the bottom of an inside 
ditch, with a strong abattis 60 yards in front. 



Such an arrangement, with artillery equal to 
that of the Rebels, would have enabled 15,000 
men to repel 60,000 for any length of time, with 
a very trifling loss on our side. This is proven 
by the evidence of all history in all past time, 
and by our late repulse at Fredericksburgh and 
Vicksburgh, where Gen. Sherman lias perhaps 
been testing his novel theory. 

(a) With regard to the entry as to sledges 
and crowbars, Gen. Sherman after swearing in 
his usual reckless way that Col. W.had no knowl- 
edge on the subject, when called for the defence 
equivocates by saying there were blacksmith's 
sledges with the batteries, and they had crow- 
bars to mend bridges (R. R. bridges,) and 
break lip railroads. The bars and sledges 
were of course on the roads. 

2. He swears that Col. W. had been predict- 
ing calamity (in conversation with him ,) of which 
he can produce no evidence. Col. W. had no 
social relations with Gen. Sherman after the 
19th of March, scarce spoke to him, and that 
not once a month, except on purely military 
matters, and predicted calamity in the hearing 
of no man in the army. Col. W. had worked 
more and was better prepared than any officer 
in the division or army, and more ready to avert 
disaster, which he did. 

McDowell's evidence will settle this. Page 
51 of the copy of proceedings sent Col. W.from 
Washington. 

3. He claims that no stronger position was 
ever bald by any army. Notwithstanding the 
result which showed that if strong it was neg- 
lected, which was so. 

4. He repeats three times that Col. W. had 
prognosticated evil to him, &c. Of this he gives, 
and can give no evidence, nor that he did so to 
any man in the army of Tennessee. 

5. He swears that a place had been left for 
Buell, who had been rightfully expected two 
weeks, but was to be sent to Hamburgh, (4 miles 
above.) This double falsehood developes itself. 
There was a gap of three-fourths of a mile on 
Sherman's left centre, through which the rebels 
swept to the attack of three divisions in flank 
and rear. Was this room enough for Buell's 
army? If Buell went to Hamburgh, could lie 
fill the gap? 

6. He repeats again, that you might search 
the world over and not find a more advanta- 
geous position. 

This is stupidity or insanity again. The 
camp was commanded by higher ground at 400 
to 600 yards in front, and all its natural advan- 
tages were unimproved, so that it did not fulfil 
a single one of the six conditions* enumerated 

*Note— From Chapter 5th of '• Halleck's Elements 
of Military Art and Science," page 115 : " The first 
condition to be s ttisfied by a tactical position is, that 
the debouches (outlets ) shall be more favorable for 
falling on the enemy when he has approached to 
the desired point than those which the enemy can 



in Halleck's elements, &c, for a good tactical 
position; though three hours' labor of 5,000 
men weuld have fulfilled all but one if not all 
of them. 

Tlie boasted creeks protecting the flanks were 
mere wagon ruts in the way of any man fit to 
command a regiment. The uneven ground, 
&e., was pore favorable to the Rebels than to 
us, for they knew it better. 

7. He says we had 43,000 men, (in line, of 
course.) Against this, he states that one supply 
boat answered for 80,000 men, or more than 
four divisions. 

We had five divisions engaged, which in his 
proportion would have had less than 35,000 
men, and the field reports will not show that 
number of all arms for duty on the morning of 
the 6 th. 

8. He swears that 10,000 men ran away. 
This is in accordance with his general charge of 
cowardice against the rank and file, who it can 

fliN ■: proven but followed, in general, more illus- 
trious examples. He was the first officer that 
day to turn from the rebel fire in presence of 
the 53d Ohio, and one of his Brigade command- 
ers was not in sight of his corps when it attacked 
the Rebel left, but was off to the landing. 
Not more than 6,000 to 7,000 well men fell back 
to the river before 3 P. M., and if he had made 
any use of his cavalry this "might have been pre- 
vented. How could he expect his infantry to 
stand -against Eebel artillery, when before noon 
he had not a single gun out of 18 to answer it, 
and this mostly for want of ammunition, with 
n ample supply less than two miles ofi". 

9. He swears that the troops held their 
ground ! How long, and what troops? Not 
the 10,000, which, as he says, ran away, nor the 
troops driven back to the landing. Why such 
gratuitous falsehood? 

10. That there were 60,000 rebel troops at 
the attack on the 6th. Beauregard and Ste- 
phonson admit not over 42,000, and Senator 
Sherman says that "Gen. Sherman was attacked 
by ten regiments supported by artillery." 

I 11. He swears that on Friday the 4th, not o 
Soldier, not an officer, not even Col. W. looked 
^r an attack. 

Gen. Sherman testified that there was reason 
to expect an attrck on Thursday, when he knew 
of no artillery in front. Why was there less 
reason to expect an attack on Friday, when he 
knew of artillery in front ? 



have for attacking: our own line of battle. Second, 
The artillery should have its full effect on all the av- 
enues of approach. Third, We should have good 
ground for maneuvering our own troops unseen, if 
possible, by the enemy. Fourth, We should have a 
full view of the enemy's maneuvers as he advances 
to the attack. Fifth, We should have ihe flanks of 
our line well protected by natural or artificial obsta- 
cles. Sixth, We should have some means of effect- 
ing a retreat without exposing our army to destruc- 
tion." 



We had evidence that the Rebels were to 
leave Corinth for Shiloh on the 1st, as they did 
on the 2d of April, and with an energetic com- 
mander they could, and should have attacked 
on the 4th of April. 

12. Gen. Sherman says, (page 16 of the re- 
cord) : "I was perfectly willing the enemy 
should attack us, and think Beauregard made a 
fatal mistake when he did it — but deny that the 
enemy had a battery near the Howell house 
that afternoon." 

Here is presumptive evidence that he was in- 
viting an attack, while he denies the truth of a 
most obvious result of the invitation, i. e. the 
advance of the Rebel artillery from its position 
of Friday, not finding even infantry pickets to 
watch it on Saturday. This fatal mistake of 
Beauregard's was the beginning of our disasters 
since. Our disgrace at Shiloh had a moral ef- 
fect in the South equal to 200,000 men ; fol- 
lowed by our lethargy on the 7th and 8th in 
failing to pursue the Rebels, and by our snail 
pace to Corinth, that moral effect was made 
operative by an immense reinforcement, suffi- 
cient to defeat McClellan at Richmond. 

13. His repeated denial of artillery in front 
Saturday afternoon, is the "delenda est Caiihago" 
of his evidence, and is weakly intended to hide 
the criminal neglect of his own artillery, which 
on Saturday night, all unacquainted with the 
ground, was posted in the rear of his center in- 
stead of upon his flanks or front. Even two 
guns on his left would have prevented Ms own 
and Appier's precipitate retreat, and had all his 
artillery been effectually used, as it might have 
been, the first attack would easily have been 
repulsed. Ask Col. Hildebrand. 

14. Gen. Sherman swears that the diary entry 
of April 3d, that we should have six batteries 
on the right, is false. According to "HaUeck's 
E'ements of the Science and Art of War," the 
proportion of artillery should be one-seventh of 
the whole. Gen. Sherman had about 7,500 
men of all arms — one-seventh of this is near 
1,100 men, which would have manned seven 
batteries, with 50 men over. A prudent gen- 
eral would have had over half the artillery of 
the army to the front, and it should have opened 
at 8 to 120© yards, wdiich it did not — and been 
in advance, where it was not. 

15. He says that Col. W.'s entry as to the 
store boats was calculated to give a false impres- 
sion of extravagance. How? 

16. If one boat furnished near 30,000 men, 
why were there six boats for 43,000, and why 
would not a warehouse of equal dimensions, 
(costing nothing,; have held what the boats 
did? 

(b) He swears that he had no cavalry sub- 
ject to his command, on Saturday April 5th. 

This is a gross evasion. He might have had 
all our cavalry in front, but this might have de- 



6 



laved or prevented the attack, and Ms promo- 
tion. 

With an unknown and as it proved a supe- 
rior force in front, was that a day to withdraw 
cavalry detachments and shift artillery from one 
division to another, from known to unknown 
-round? Ask Frederick, or Napoleon, or Wel- 
lington, or Scott. 

17. He swears that an order was issued on 
the 5th, that the 4th Illinois cavalry and a regi- 
ment of McDowell's brigade should march on a 
scout at daylight Monday morning. 

He produced no evidence of such an order, 
and the troops did not start. Was this order 
countermanded because he had secret inforwia- 
tion that we would be attacked in force at, as he 
says, 8 A. M. of the 6th? Though the attack 
was at 7 A. M. 



The evidence before the Court, summed up, 
shows — 

That no objection is made by Gun. Sherman 
to the entries of March 20th and '2Mb, and April 
1st, 1862. 

March 27 th. That he defends the absence of 
defenses, thus admitting there were none.' 

March 29th. He acknowledges the reduction 
of the requisition for axes, and admits that he 
does not know if they were delivered. The 
Qr. M. Sergt. and his Sergt. Parsons testify that 
they were not. 

M arch 29th. Gen. Sherman does not deny 
inviting an attack, and says he was perfectly 
willing an attack should be made. Beyond 
this, if further proof were wanting, the follow- 
ing queries arise : 

1st. Did he invite an attack by having no de- 
tachments over 6 mdes out, they light ones, 
and only in daylight? 

2d. By having no properly disposed artillery, 
even after the attack had commenced on the 
6th. 

3d. By sending out no cavalry detachments 
on the 5th, or infantry either. 

4th. By paying no attention to the driving in 
of his pickets on the morning of the 5th. 

5th. By paying no attention to the acknow- 
ledged presence of an army in his front on the 
4th of April, 1862. 

6th. By still leaving his left center regiment 
(Appier's 53d Ohio,) severed too far from its 
proper brigade, with a morass between them. 

7th. By leaving his left Brigade near two 
miles from the Division center. 



Buell, which it was not intended Buell should 
fill — thus admitting the truth of the diary entry 
that the troops covered too much ground. His 
own and other evidence shows that the pickets 
of the 1st Brigade at the Howell house, &c, 
were not over a mile out. The troops cannot 
be said to have supported each other, and there 
is no evidence that they did by flank or front 
movements till late in the day. 

That his Div. Qr. M. kept no stores except 
forage, and would receive none, is proven by the 
Qr. M. and his Sergt. Parsons. He does not 
deny the number and expense of the store boats, 
lie states in his evidence that we had reason to 
expect an attack on the 3d, which McDowell 
states Col. W. had indicated to him two or three 
days before the 3d. 

If Halleck is right, we should have had over 
seven batteries with Sherman's Division. (Col. 
W. imputes no blame to Shermen in this, though 
he might with propriety have done so.) 

The above statement, to say nothing of the 
result, prove the existence of that incompeter •, 
improvidence and neglect which have chai. - 
terixed the conduct of at least three of the Gen- 
erals concerned, in and since the battle of Shiloh. 

April 4th. On this day Gen. Sherman was 
first assured of Rebel artillery, and, as be says, 
of the elements of an army in his front, the "desti- 
nation and pinpise of which he did not know" ! n 
Was it not negligence to delay an instant in at 
least taking measures to discover this destina- 
tion and purpose, and to drive back or disperse 
these elements before the army was perfected. 
' To delay the concentration of the 3d Briga le 
(Hiklebrand's,) of his Division, and of the L e 
Divisions. 

To leave the artillery in the rear of the cen- 
ter ; to make no defences on the flanks ; to cut 
no timber in the front. 

Was it not negligence to attempt the 
carrying out of no one of Halleck's tactic- 
al conditions ? — to prepare no hospitals ; to 
indicate no rallying points for different corps, 
no reserves ; to prepare no ammunition maga- 
zines ; to neglect all repair of all , roads and 
bridges to the landing, and between the differ- 
ent divisions, and to neglect many other deiails 
requiring the attention of any general havin.' an 
enemy within a week, or a day, to say nor ifig 
of an hour's march; and, beyond this, was it not 
neglect to make no effort to find out the actual 
strength and position of the enemy ? 

April 5 — The evidence of the proper officers 
proves that the pickets of three brigades were 
in whole or in part driven in on this day at 7 



8th. By leaving a gap of 1000 yards between A. M., and afterwards, and the same was re- 
bitnself and Prentiss on his left, in front of I ported to the proper authority 
which no pickets were stationed, and through 
which the Piebels swept unopposed to the at- 
tack of the fiank and rear of his own, McCler- 
i land's and Prentiss' Divisions. 

April 3d. He admits confusion at the land- 
ing, and admits that a gap had been left for 



2. That there was artillery seen by the 
troops, and heard of by Col. W., in at least two 
positions in front, and the same was reported to 
Gen. Sherman that afternoon ; and that there 
was not only five, but perhaps one hundred 
regiments within cannon range of the camp on 



7 



Saturday night. If the truth, then, may be ♦CIKCULAU. 

nought in evidence, where is the falsehood or ()m . situation from the rain aud roads bae bseeme 
libel in the diary extracts, written, as the court difficult, and it. becomes the duty of every efficient 

" man to anticipate our danger and to labor. Every 
ounce of food and forage must be regarded as pre- 
cious as diamonds.* 

Roads will be impassable* and our bridges swept 
away. * * ' * 

Men must at once be limited in bread and meat. 
All live stock in our lines must be driven in and used , 
and all grass, wheat, and everything fit for f< 
gathered. Horses will be allowed to eat on bushes, 
such as elm, cottonwood and sassafras, gathered for 
this use at once. * * 

We cannot be assailed by artillery, because the 



finds, not after, but before the event, when 
falsehood was impossible, and libel only to be 
proven by the event ? The result of the battle 
sustained the diary in all points in which it 
could be so sustained, and the evidence before 
the court does the same. And yet the court, 
on Gen. Sherman's testimony, iinds Col. W. 
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a 
crentle'man, for printing false and libelous mat- 



tor contained in the diary extracts for eircula- 

tion-no evidence whatever being offered that I enemy <*f$$ $$£*&**■? T^** 

there was any copy in existence but the rmper- Qm . ri hi ig t , K , p ; )iat of daag)er> ;m a will reeeh • 

feet proof sheet before the court — as indeed the personal attention of the General, but he can d 

there was not. The heading' of "private and con- ! nothing 

fidential" was intended to caution the printer, 

and would not have remained but for Gen. 

Sherman's charge. The evidence of Col. Eilby 

Smith and the letter to Gen. Ilalleck* show that 

the paper was intended for him, with his own 

consent and suggestion ; and such a publication 

is not forbidden under the circumstances by the 

army regulations or military propriety, it having 

been withheld till the campaign was over. 



unless his orders are strictly observed, and 
these are that all article.-; of provision and forage be 
put under guard and dealt out at half rations. * * 
Bv order of Brig Gen. W. T. .Sherman. 

' J. H. HAMMOND, A. A. Gen. 
Gamp No. 3, May 3 3 LS62. 



*W« bad then op hand ten days' store* 



Order; 



*0f May 11, 1- 



APPENDIX. 



The following letter of Col W. to Gen. Hal- 
leck, with extracts from two of Gen. Sherman's 
■orders, will show to what criminal follies or 
caprices he is addicted : 

Gamp near Monterey, May 7, 1862. 
Major-General Halleck : 

Sir : — 1 consider it my duty to call your attention 
to the enclosed "Circular." However creditable to 
the zeal of Gen. Sherman, it certainly can do little 
credit to the energy of the service, nor is it encoura- 
giug to the troops, on whom it is calculated to have a 
depressing effect. If we are to be put upon half ra- 
tions, and chance forage at thirteen miles from our 
base of operations by a few hours' rain, how can the 
army hope, within any reasonable time, to effect the 
object of its organization, and put an end to the war ? 
One-third of the men in this army would bridge the 
road to the rivVrin a day, with proper tools, which 
we should have. This done, there would be no 
trouble about getting on material, while the moral 
effect would be equal to twenty thousand men. 

So far as the forage for t|ie horses, Ac., is con- 
cerned, there is not an elm or cottonwood to a square 
mile, aud they will not eat sassafras. T do not in the 
least apprehend an attack, but see no reason why the 

fuemy could not bring up artillery on account ot the 
oads, having done so a month ago. 

I also inclose Order No. 21, exhibiting far more 
zeal than discretion. Men with the usual camp dis- 
ease above all things require quiet, and, whatever 
their disposition, are not in a condition to study brig- 
ade drill. The effect of such orders is obviously to 
produce discontent and demoralization, of which there 
is an ample amount existing. 

If an effort were made to supply the troops with 
fresh bread and better hospitals, the effect would be 
far more obvious in their improved organization than 
any benefit which can result from such orders as the 
above. Very respectfully, 

T. WORTHINGTON, Col. 4Gth Reg. O.V.I. 



No. 21.] 

Headquarters Fifth Division, ( 

Grant's Corps D'Armee, April 25, 1862.)" 

The importance of brigade drill is such that the 

Commanding General will permit no officer or soldier 

to be absent if he can possibly be "on the ground , 

either in the ranks, armed or unarmed, or as a wituess. 

If the men are unable to bear arms, they will form 
on the left of the company unarmed. If not in hospi- 
tal, but suffering from diarrhea, they can be hauled 
to the drill ground by the Colonel's order, and there 
they must be silent' and observe the movement- "1 
the division. * * 

Bv order of Brig. Gen. W. T. Sherman. 

J. II. HAMMOND, A. A. Gen. 
Official : Vv r . BE. Harlanp, A. A. A. G. 

■missions are not material. 

Errors and Concealments of Facts in 
Gen. W. T. Sherman's Division Re- 
port of April IS, 1862. 
1st. Gen. Sherman says nothing about the 
driving in of his pickets on Saturday morning, 
or of his having out no cavalry scouts or detach- 
ments of any kind that day: 

2d,. He says nothing of the artillery reported 
to Gen. Grant on Friday nor of its presence 
within a mile of the camp on Saturday. 

3d. There was no advance guard, properly 
speaking, out on Sunday morning, and very few 
pickets, under the circumstances. 

4th. Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries, un- 
til half an hour after the attack, were posted in 
the rear of the division center. But two guns of 
Taylor's (or Barrett's) battery came to Hilde- 
brand's camp, and they were deficient in gun- 
ners, which Hildebrand supplied. 

5th. The fact is concealed that two of the 
regiments from McClernand lay behind the 3d 
brigade an hour and a half, and retired without 
firing a shot. The third regiment to the left of 



Watterhouse's battery gave it no support, and 
before the rebels were in range fired one volley 
and ran away. 

Gth. Gen. Sherman did not see Col. Appier 
after the occasion on which his orderly was 
killed, nor did Appier's regiment stand over ten 
or fifteen minutes, if that long, after Sherman 
rode away on the death of his orderly. 

7th. The battle began by an attack of infantry, 
and no Eebcl artillery was heard till ten or fif- 
teen minutes afterwards. 

Sth. Our infantry and artillery did not open 
along the whole line. Behr's battery was idle, 
as well as the whole of the 1st Brigade, with 
the exception of a few volleys of the 40th Illi- 
nois, and one gun of the battery which threw 
half a dozen shells at a log house over the 
valley. 

9th. Appier's Regiment broke before 7\<, in- 
stead of 9 A. M., as Sherman states in his re- 
port. 

10th. Both Brigades of Sherman's center 
were driven back at or before 9 A. M., and the 
1st followed immediately after — though not at- 
tacked, as might be supposed from the tenor of 
the report. 

11. The statement as to Behr's battery does 
great injustice to the corps composing it. Sher- 
man ordered them from their position 300 to 400 
yards from the cross roads into the line of ad- 
vancing Rebels, and the woods were such at the 
cross roads that to come properly into battery 
was impossible. 

12th. It is not true that Buckland's Brigade 
maintained an organization after the center was 
driven back. 

13th. The attack was not made upon Mc- 
Clernand'e front, but upon his left flank and 
rear. 

14th. Gen. Sherman did not move McDow- 
ell's Brigade against the Rebel left flank. The 
46th O. first attacked through necessity. The 6th 
Iowa followed, and Sherman ordered the 40th 
Illinois forward, after the Col. commanding the 
brigade had run away. 

15th. The first brigade came up to where the, 
battle was raging, across the center of McCler- 
i land's camp about noon, and a retreat of the 
whole line was ordered at or a little before 2 
P. M., and the position was not held four hours 
after noon of the 6th. 

• 16th. Gen. Sherman suppresses the fact that 
all his artillery was useless by noon, mainly for 
want of ammunition, with plenty less than two 
miles off. 

1 7th. Col. McDowell was not severely injured 
by a fall from his house, and had started unin- 
jured to the river before his brigade had fairly 
attacked the Rebel left. When the 46th wheeled 
out of line to attack a superior rebel force on its 
right, Col. McDowell was not to be seen by any 



part of his brigade, some of his staff, perhaps 
excepted. 

18th. Col. McDowell's brigade was not at- 
tacked, as the report would imply ; nor did Col. 
McDowell conduct any attack on the Rebel 
force any where that day. Gen. Sherman was 
well aware of his cowardice when he wrote his 
rcpnrt on the l^kh, yet still continued him in 
the command of the 1st Brigade. 

19th. Gen. Sherman makes less mention of 
Col. Worthington than any Col. of the Division 
who did not run awaj r , though knowing that it 
was the rapid wheel to the right and murder- 
ous fire of the 46th which prevented the entire 
rout of the 1st Brigade, which Gen. Sherman has 
repeatedly stated saved the two hours which 
rescued the army from utter ruin. There are 
not less than thirty or forty other errors of fact 
in this truthless report. 

Gen. Sherman was not surprised, but many 
thousands of the army were, by his assurance 
to the 3d Brigade after dark on Saturday, that 
they might sleep as secure in tbeir tents that i 
night as if at home at Ohio. Sherman's main 
effort was to bring on the attack before Buell's 
arrival. 



Extract from Col. W.s unfinished de- 
fense before the Court at Memphis. 

"I did in extreme cases report to Genei u 
Sherman, but all social communion between 
had ceased after the 19th of March, 1862, wh< n 
I had reluctantly cencluded that he was utte |J 
unfit for his position, and he knowing that 1 
knew it, I had nothing to expect but thai 
would disgrace myself and regiment, if he could, 
as has since occurred. From what I heard from 
him within a week after my arrival at Paducah, 
I concluded that he could not safely be trust- 
ed with any "separate and important soimnariil." 
Every day has more and more, and more con- 
firmed this conviction ; and if anything more 
was wanting, the manner in which this trial has 
been brought on, * * * and the false and con- 
tradictory evidence given here by him, cumu- 
late the conclusion that he is utterly unfit and 
incompetent for any responsible command. 

Should he wish to change sides, he could 
bring ample arguments to show that his action 
has been unfavorable to the Union. * * *■ 
I kenw perfectly well that he knew of the rebel 
artillery in our front on the oth of April ; and 
how could he ignore the fact when he had heard 
those guns on Friday, which should have been 
hunted up on Saturday, as they were not. Sat- 
urday was by the rebels made a day of rest 
within cannon shot of our camp ; and if there 
was ever an invitation to an enemy to make an 
attack, when, how and where he chose, that in- 
vitation was given to the rebel army on the 5th 
and 6th of April, 1S62, by Maj. Gen. W. T. 
Sherman . 



£/?£) 



